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Industrial Tribunals and the Regulation of  Bargaining 
Andrew Frazer*
This chapter seeks to apply ‘new’ regulation theory to industrial tribunals, in par-
ticular the functions and powers of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) in relation to enterprise bargaining and the making of collec-
tive workplace agreements. In a conventional economic sense, industrial 
tribunals have always been regulatory agencies, with their awards operating as 
labour standards setting minimum pay and conditions. Since the 1990s, though, 
the major work and impact of industrial tribunals has changed from making 
awards to the facilitation and approval of agreements as part of the process of 
labour market “deregulation.” As (at the time of final revision of this paper) it 
now appears that any powers of the AIRC to supervise agreement-making will 
shortly and finally be abolished, we are in a position to review the particular ap-
proach adopted for the regulation of workplace bargaining over the last decade. 
If industrial tribunals will no longer have a regulatory role to play in the setting 
of conditions by agreements, the opportunity also arises for us to consider what 
new type of institution might now be appropriate for the inevitable regulation 
which occurs within the labour market.  
The industrial tribunals which have been so central a feature of Australian labour 
relations for more than a century, appear in many ways to be unlike conventional 
regulatory agencies. As quasi-judicial bodies, the tribunals have been to only a 
limited extent driven by policy objectives. They have remained heavily influenced 
by legal norms (both formal rules and informal values) which are not necessarily 
outcome-oriented. The organisational character of legal tribunals makes them 
weak and dependent regulators. Their traditional method of resolving disputes, 
on an individual basis as brought before them (and usually reactively rather than 
proactively), is at odds with the steering and monitoring functions of a regula-
tory agency. Even tribunals with specific enforcement powers are dependent on 
other officials to carry out their orders, relying heavily on their authority to instil 
customary obedience. The AIRC, as a result of the Boilermakers doctrine, has no 
power to enforce its own orders.1
* Dr Andrew Frazer is a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. 
1 R v Kirby; ex p Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 Commonwealth Law Reports 
254. 
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These factors have often led industrial tribunals to be seen (particularly by their 
members) as not truly regulatory agencies at all. In decades past this view was 
often expressed as a distinction between a judicial tribunal guided by values, and 
a legislative body focussed on goals. In recent times, the tribunals’ focus on me-
diation and dispute resolution has led them to be appear more as sites of 
negotiation than directive agencies. The federal tribunal in particular has at-
tempted to exercise a co-ordinating and steering function at crucial periods; but 
at most times in most situations it has behaved more as a resolver of disputes or 
a facilitator. A reluctance to consider the tribunals as regulators (in other than 
their economic standard-setting role in framing wages and conditions) has been 
aided by the idea of regulation as the work of a strong steering and enforcement 
body which we now identify as “command-and-control” regulation. A broader 
approach to regulation, however, will allow us to examine the part played by tri-
bunals in the regulation of all aspects of labour relations, including the conduct 
of relations between parties engaged in bargaining and the making of agree-
ments. 
Institutionalism and Regulation 
Although regulation has traditionally been associated with state activity, in the 
‘new regulation’ theory it has been broadened to include all systematic attempts 
by social actors, both ‘public’ and ‘private’, to affect behaviour according to pre-
determined aims or desired outcomes.2 Much of the new regulation scholarship 
is founded on an institutionalist approach, one which recognises social processes 
as influenced by a wide range of regulatory influences (the ‘web of regulation’). 
These include not merely organisations exerting formal legal and economic 
power, but informal norms based on values and social roles or expectations, as 
well as cognitively internalised patterns of thought based on what is practicable, 
normal or natural.3 It is on such informal social institutions that new regulatory 
techniques, such as industry self-regulation, are based. The institutionalist ap-
proach allows us to step outside the discourse of regulation and deregulation, 
and to focus instead on the social patterns and networks which surround actors, 
both ‘public’ and ‘private’.  
The signal feature of the new regulatory state is its use of techniques of meta-
regulation: the regulation of regulation. State regulatory agencies are less in-
 
2 Black, J, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems at 142.  
3 Parker C and Braithwaite J, “Regulation” in Cane P and Tushnet M (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford UP, Oxford, 2003) p 136. On institutionalist ap-
proaches to regulation, see Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1999) pp 30-31. On the variety of regulatory 
techniques, see the paper by Peter Gahan in this volume. 
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volved in direct control over outcomes and now become concerned with oversee-
ing the formulation of procedural standards by private actors: it is the process of 
(self-)regulation which is regulated.4 State agencies are less involved in directly 
ensuring individual compliance through techniques such as inspection and li-
censing; they now engage in distanced monitoring of self-reported compliance 
with standards. Meta-regulation involves increased emphasis on the state’s use of 
“legal underpinning for indirect control over internal normative systems”.5
A more distanced regulation must rely on more formal and juridically-based 
techniques of monitoring and compliance, rather than informal norms like trust 
and professional standards. Paradoxically, then, and despite the claims of de-
regulationists, meta-regulation generally leads to greater formality in the state’s 
involvement in regulation, and often results in an increase in intervention by 
‘foreign’ agencies. What is often happening is a change in techniques: different 
mechanisms are used to regulate, and often by different agencies.6 There is a 
change in the regulatory object, composition, form and motive: of what to regu-
late, in what manner, and why. In many ways it has resulted in a much more 
pervasive and complex web of rules, with much more detailed and invasive pro-
cedural and monitoring requirements. According to Bronwen Morgan, what 
makes meta-regulators different from more traditional agencies like government 
departments or quangos, is their combination of attributes: not only are they 
autonomous and often deliberately divorced from political influence, with tech-
nical expertise (usually economics), specific regulatory roles and often wide 
investigatory powers, but they increasingly have the ability to make legally bind-
ing decisions or rules.7 This description is not very far removed from the 
attributes traditionally identified as possessed by Australian industrial tribunals. 
Meta-regulation implies regulatory pluralism — as “new modalities of pluralized 
and decentralized regulation” evolve in the shift from the control-oriented wel-
fare state to the steering of private-public partnerships.8 Regulation broadens 
out to become the whole network of formed and layered relations between ac-
tors, each attempting to influence the others. Such a conception leads to a focus 
on regulatory space. Originally proposed by Hancher and Moore in 1989, regula-
tory space is an analytical construct designed to move beyond a command-based 
view of regulation as limited to government regulators and private ‘regulatees’. 
 
4 Morgan B, “The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial 
Legality” (2003) 12 Social & Legal Studies at 490. 
5 Scott C, “Regulation in the age of governance: the rise of the post-regulatory state” in 
Jordana J and Levi-Faur D (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Examining Regulatory Institu-
tions and Instruments in the Governance Age (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004) p 168. 
6 Majone G, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe” in Baldwin R, Scott C and Hood C 
(eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1998) pp 195, 212. 
7 Morgan, op cit, p 490. 
8 Parker and Braithwaite, op cit, p 129. 
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Hancher and Moore noted that large private organisations are frequently active 
participants in regulatory processes, influencing the range of issues considered 
appropriate for regulation and the techniques used to regulate. Regulation has 
become a common space, which is defined by “the range of regulatory issues 
subject to public decision” within a regulatory arena. Regulation is the outcome 
of a struggle between the active participants (the regulatory community) operat-
ing in a particular arena. The allocation of an issue to a particular arena is largely 
a matter of “customary assumptions and organisational routine.”9 More recently, 
Colin Scott has used the concept of regulatory space to highlight the modern 
condition of regulation as dispersed and fragmented. Authority to regulate is 
dispersed among numerous value systems, extending beyond legal systems 
based in property and rights to include wealth, information and the ability to act 
effectively (through organisational ability and strategic co-ordination). Regulation 
is fragmented among a range of different actors, each exerting influence in par-
ticular areas.10 
Regulation, then, is the sum total of numerous intersecting and conflicting inter-
ests and value systems, each modifying or attenuating the others. In the field of 
labour relations, the challenge is to see public agencies like industrial tribunals 
not as regulatory engines acting on others, but as actors in a regulatory space in-
teracting with others (even being regulated by them) at several levels (legal, 
organisational, cultural).  
The Enterprise Bargaining Regime and its Regulatory Space 
The changes to industrial regulation in Australia have been so substantial over 
the last fifteen years that we can talk of a new regulatory regime. There has been 
created a distinct regulatory arena, that of bargaining (or more accurately 
agreement-making), which sets the tone of labour market regulation. Agreements 
are now the dominant method by which wages and conditions are determined; 
and even for the substantial minority of workers who remain under awards the 
nature of regulation has shifted in tone. The federal Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (WRA) contains several legal structures and processes for agreement mak-
ing which formalise this regime of enterprise bargaining. Far from being 
synonymous with collective bargaining, it is compatible with a range of individ-
ual agreement types; indeed the current regime of enterprise bargaining is 
associated genealogically and ideologically with individualisation and the reduc-
tion of union involvement as direct participants in workplace governance.  
 
9 Hancher L and Moran M, “Organizing Regulatory Space” in Hancher L and Moran M (eds), 
Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) pp 277-8. 
10 Scott C, “Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design” 
[2001] Public Law at 333. 
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In Australia there has long been a significant number of informal collective 
agreements which, though often reduced to writing, are unenforceable at law. To 
these we may add the ‘sweetheart deals’, tacit arrangements and above-award 
payments which can become widespread and entrenched by custom. It is one of 
the objects of the enterprise bargaining regime to displace such informal means 
of regulation with formal ones, while shifting control into the internal regulatory 
processes of the corporation. Altogether the enterprise bargaining regime in-
volves limiting the level, the scope and the coverage of workplace regulation by 
restricting formal institutions and norms external to the employing organisa-
tion.11 
With the shift to a bargaining regime, legal norms have become more constitu-
tive in function, providing the means by which parties may produce a legally 
recognised and enforceable agreement, without however creating institutional 
pathways or normative rules which address how bargaining actually takes place, 
or attempting to equalise the relative power of the parties in order to establish 
the terms on which it takes place. The enterprise bargaining regime thus relies 
heavily on informal institutions along with rules which limit certain kinds of ac-
tion (particularly industrial action by unions). The informal institutions tend to 
reinforce asymmetries between negotiating parties, thus favouring the employer. 
Employers have alternatives to negotiation, such as unilaterally introducing 
change through managerial prerogative and individual contracts, while unions 
must rely on bargaining: for them, industrial action is not an alternative to nego-
tiation but a tactic in the bargaining process.12 
The AIRC and the Institutions of  Bargaining 
The development of enterprise bargaining at the federal level since 1991 has in-
volved a shift from a public basis for legally enforceable agreements to a private 
one, and part of this shift has been a steady and deliberate erosion of the AIRC’s 
functions. Before 1991, the commission could refuse to certify an agreement if it 
considered the terms to be contrary to the public interest. This approach re-
flected the status of awards as public regulatory standards, and the AIRC as both 
determiner and guardian of those standards. While certified agreements were not 
required to conform to the commission’s wage-fixing principles and standard 
award conditions, any inconsistencies were scrutinised closely and the commis-
 
11 Bray M and Waring P, “’Complexity’ and ‘Congruence’ in Australian Labour Regulation” 
(2005) 47 Journal of Industrial Relations at 2; Bray M and Waring P, “The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Bargaining Structures Under the Howard Government” (1998) 9 Labour and 
Industry at 62, 77.  
12 Fells R, “A Critical Examination of the Process of Workplace Negotiation” (1998) 9 La-
bour and Industry at 41. 
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sion exercised a high level of discretion.13 However when the federal govern-
ment announced that it would introduce amendments designed to facilitate a 
shift towards enterprise bargaining, the commission was forced to accept a re-
duction in its control, announcing in its October 1991 wage decision that it 
would approve agreements which merely implemented its efficiency principles.  
As part of its new supervisory role, the commission declared that from now on it 
would refrain from using arbitral powers to resolve disputes over the conduct of 
bargaining, leaving such issues to conciliation or to negotiation between the par-
ties.14 This approach was enshrined in the 1992 amendments and by the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act the following year. From this time the AIRC was 
required to approve single-enterprise agreements which satisfied an overall “no 
disadvantage” test when compared with awards (although retention of a limited 
public interest component within the no disadvantage test still allowed the 
commission some discretion to consider community standards in deciding 
whether to approve agreements).15 Under the Reform Act, the AIRC was given 
power to oversee the bargaining process, although its power was only facilitative 
and could not be used to enforce bargaining in good faith.16 
The regulatory regime under the WRA largely continued the institutions of bar-
gaining which are inherited from the early 1990s, while developing further the 
private rationale for agreement-making. Because of previous concerns at the 
AIRC’s ‘obstruction’ of enterprise bargaining by using the public interest test, the 
legislation is deliberately drafted to minimise any activist investigative role by 
the commission in the certification process. Now the commission must certify an 
agreement unless satisfied that the statutory requirements have not been met; 
the presumption is in favour of compliance and the commission’s discretion is 
closely hedged by the legislation.17 The adoption of the global “no disadvantage” 
test has involved a shrinking of public regulatory space, as fewer trade-offs 
against award standards are amenable to external scrutiny. And the eschewing of 
any activist role for the AIRC in the facilitation of bargaining has ensured that its 
influence over social actors, even at an informal level, is marginal. 
13 Industrial Relations Act 1988, ss. 112, 115(4); February 1989 Review (1989) 27 Industrial 
Reports 196. 
14 National Wage Case, October 1991 (1991) 39 Industrial Reports 127. 
15 Industrial Relations Act 1988-92 s. 134E(2); Industrial Relations Act 1988-93 s.170MC(2); 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Tweed 
Valley Fruit Processors (1995) 61 Industrial Reports 212 at 232. 
16 Industrial Relations Act 1988-93 Pt VIB Div 5, especially s. 170QK; Appeal by Public Sec-
tor Union (ABC Case), Print L4605; Asahi Diamond Industrial Australia Pty Ltd v 
Automotive Food Metals and Engineering Union (1995) 59 Industrial Reports 385 at 421-
8. 
17 WRA s. 170LT(1); Re Appeal by Council of Holmesglen Institute of TAFE (1998) 83 Indus-
trial Reports 172. 
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In an institutionalist sense, the AIRC now exerts a regulatory influence primarily 
by maintaining pathways through which other actors may interact but which are 
not mandatory (the bargaining process), and by acting as a gateway for the for-
malisation and legal validity of agreements (the certification process). Through 
its decisions during certification proceedings, it operates as a source of formal 
norms for observance by the parties, However, as these norms are only relevant 
to certification, the commission is able to exert only limited influence on the par-
ties who use other, informal, options.  
Here I will sketch the formal institutions created by the legislation, focusing on 
the capacity of the commission to influence (regulate) the interactions between 
bargaining parties, either directly or in a constitutive way.18 
Bargaining parties 
The AIRC has little involvement in supervising the constitution of bargaining 
parties as in most cases agreements are made between an employer corporation 
(in relation to a single business or project), and the employees (or at least a ma-
jority of them) subject to the proposed agreement. Where bargaining involves 
unions directly, the AIRC has played an indirect role through its supervision of 
the status of registered organisations.  In practice this is a formality as no new 
unions have been created for years, although amalgamations sometimes still oc-
cur. The AIRC is also involved in determining which unions may make an 
agreement over a particular business; through regulation of the union’s eligibility 
rules, it can affect whether a union is “entitled to represent the industrial inter-
ests” of particular employees and is therefore eligible to make an agreement 
covering them.19 
The Agreement 
Agreements are limited in their subject-matter. The WRA establishes rules about 
which types of matters are capable of being included in an agreement, as well as 
nominating matters which must be included (dispute resolution procedures) and 
which must not be included (provisions deemed to contravene freedom of asso-
ciation, provisions inconsistent with the statutory minimum conditions, or ones 
with discriminatory effect).20 These requirements and restrictions come into 
play at the certification stage, when the AIRC must be satisfied that they have 
 
18 This section of the paper is based on the study of over 80 decisions by the AIRC in rela-
tion to bargaining (mostly certification applications), as well as a separate database of 
applications for termination or suspension of bargaining periods. For reasons of space, 
footnote references to specific decisions have been kept to a minimum. 
19 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (henceforth WRA) s. 170LJ(1)(b). 
20 WRA ss. 170LT(8), 170LU. 
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been met before the agreement can be granted legal status. They are highly pre-
scriptive and give neither the parties nor the commission discretion to consider 
or adapt the terms in their industrial context. 
The general restriction, that the contents of the agreement must be “about mat-
ters pertaining to the relationship” between the employer and employees subject 
to the agreement (s. 170LI), has been the subject of extensive litigation in recent 
years. The High Court decision in Electrolux21 confirmed that each matter in the 
agreement must pertain to the employment relationship, but there is still no 
clear test for determining which matters satisfy the requirement. Although 
vague, the rule is rigid: there is no discretion for either the parties or the com-
mission, and finding that a matter in an agreement does not pertain to the 
employment relationship requires the commission to refuse to certify the agree-
ment. By comparison with a holistic approach which considered the relevance of 
the agreement in its totality, the strict or narrow approach which now prevails 
limits the scope for co-operative regulation by the parties and for flexibility by 
the commission in approving agreements.22 
Bargaining period 
Although the bargaining period is a common feature of bargaining, it is not a 
necessary feature of agreement making under the federal system. While the Act 
contemplates that a party may initiate negotiations by notifying other proposed 
parties and the commission of their intention to seek a certified agreement (s. 
170MI), it is not a prerequisite to the making or certification of an agreement. Its 
main purpose is to allow for protected industrial action by the parties. A bargain-
ing period is therefore most likely to be initiated by unions: an employer can 
always commence agreement-making directly with employees without notifying a 
bargaining period, and once a union-notified bargaining period commences the 
employer can also engage in protected action. As the commission cannot arbi-
trate during a bargaining period (s. 170N), this may provide impetus to the 
parties to negotiate; although again this is more likely to affect unions, which 
have no other recourse to achieve their aims if the employer is not willing to 
bargain. 
The AIRC clearly plays a direct regulatory role in the suspension or termination 
of bargaining periods (s.170MW). When the WRA was first passed, it was assumed 
 
21 Electrolux Home Products Pty Limited v Australian Workers’ Union [2004] HCA 40. 
22 The holistic approach to the ‘matters pertaining’ issue (now discredited by Electrolux)
was justified as a matter of freedom for the bargaining parties: Automotive, Food, Met-
als, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Unilever Australia Ltd,
PR940027, 31/10/03 at [165]-[168]; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & 
Kindred Industries Union v Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 199 at [99]-
[101]. 
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that such applications would be used to stifle industrial action, but it seems that 
they are often being used to bring matters before the commission. There has 
been an average of 76 applications annually, of which only about 18 are actually 
decided: the large majority are withdrawn or settled. Of those cases which are 
determined there is a success rate of about 60 percent. Unions are responsible 
for initiating 22.5 percent of concluded cases. Industrial action is the basis of the 
action in less than half of decided cases. Bargaining conduct and compliance 
comprise nearly one-quarter of cases, the main ground being that the respondent 
did not genuinely try to reach an agreement. Applications are frequently sought 
together with dispute orders under s. 127.23 While the commission is limited by 
the legislation to specific grounds for suspending or terminating a bargaining 
period, most of the decisions are made by reference to broad considerations, 
with the public interest emerging as a significant factor. The AIRC engages in 
conciliation in many cases after the bargaining period has been terminated, al-
though relatively few matters go on to arbitration. 
Within the space of the bargaining period, certain forms of industrial action are 
insulated from legal retaliation. Industrial action outside this space is not pro-
tected by any immunity and is considered illegitimate.24 It is then subject to 
suppression by the courts using their broad injunctive powers to restrain com-
mission of industrial torts and secondary boycotts. The protection is only 
available in relation to making agreements under the Act: immunity is not pro-
vided for action supporting claims which cannot be included in a certified 
agreement.25 
Unprotected action may also be regulated by the AIRC’s power to issue dispute 
orders, which in many ways function like former bans clauses to prohibit specific 
action. Such orders are generally observed by unions without recourse to injunc-
tions from the Federal Court. Applications for dispute orders have become a 
means of bringing matters before the commission, supplementing the conven-
tional dispute notification process. Indirectly then, the commission has become 
involved in the regulation of disputes: even when there is a bargaining period in 
place and a dispute order is not available, notification of the matter brings the 
commission into the picture, enabling it to exercise at least its conciliation func-
tion.
23 This is preliminary information derived from a database of 142 decisions by the AIRC 
on s.170MW, currently being analysed by the author. Over 24% of cases concerned the 
anomalous ground of paid rates applications. 
24 National Workforce Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers Union [1998] 3 VR 265. 
25 Electrolux per Gleeson CJ at [25]; Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ at [156]; Wesfarmers 
Premier Coal Ltd v Automotive Food Metals Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union (No 2) (2004) 138 Industrial Reports 362. 
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Facilitation of  bargaining: Conciliation powers 
While the Act precludes the AIRC from arbitrating during a bargaining period, it 
does allow the commission to use its normal conciliation powers, which the 
commission from the start has recognised as allowing it to make recommenda-
tions or directions to parties “to promote the efficient conduct of 
negotiations.”26 Increasingly this power has been used to regulate the parties’ 
conduct in bargaining (or avoiding it). Ever since the Reform Act introduced the 
bargaining period regime in 1993, members of the commission have been wary 
of becoming closely enmeshed in disputes over recognition and bargaining con-
duct. In the Asahi Case the commission laid down the principle that, even though 
the Reform Act recognised a duty to bargain in good faith and gave the commis-
sion powers to ensure that they did so, the commission could not actually order 
parties to negotiate: at best it could only order them to meet and confer.27 After 
that, the commission’s role in hard-fought bargaining disputes, particularly con-
tests over union recognition, faded away.  
The way for a more activist regulatory role in the bargaining process came with 
the full bench Telstra decision in 2000 that the AIRC’s powers to issue directions 
and orders are not confined to arbitration, although it was not determined how 
far those powers could go in conciliation.28 In decisions since then, the commis-
sion has frequently made recommendations as part of conciliation proceedings, 
sometimes acting after being notified of the initiation of a bargaining period. In a 
few cases the commission has issued orders designed to aid progress in stalled 
bargaining, particularly ordering a secret ballot of employees to determine which 
type of agreement they preferred. 
The high point came with Sensis, a classic case of the employer refusing to nego-
tiate with the union and instead seeking an agreement directly with its 
employees. In its bargaining period notice, the union requested the AIRC to fa-
cilitate making an agreement by use of its conciliation powers: specifically it 
requested that union officers be allowed to attend and assist employee represen-
tatives in negotiation meetings with management. The commissioner at first 
instance held that the WRA recognises a duty to bargain in good faith and thus 
allows the AIRC to make procedural orders to promote fair bargaining, although 
it could not affect the substantive issues between the parties.29 The decision was 
 
26 WRA ss. 170N, 170NA; Safety Net Review – Wages, April 1997, Print P1997, 22/4/97.  
27 Asahi Diamond Industrial Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive Food Metals and Engineering 
Union, Print L9800, 1/3/95; Industrial Relations Act 1988-93, s. 170QK(2)(a). 
28 Community and Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd, Print S7179, 20/6/00 at 
[21]. 
29 Community and Public Sector Union v Sensis Pty Ltd: Supplementary Decision, PR930269, 
10/4/03. A decision had previously been made ordering a secret ballot on the basis that 
the employer had not bargained in good faith: Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry 
Union v Great Southern Railways/Serco, PR908235, 28/8/01. 
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upheld on appeal by a full bench, though not on the basis of a duty of fair bar-
gaining. The AIRC’s power derived from its function of facilitating the making 
and certification of agreements:  
 It follows from these provisions that the power to issue directions should be ex-
ercised so as to give primacy to the object of ensuring the primary responsibility 
for determination of terms and conditions rests with employers and employees at 
the workplace or enterprise level and that the choice of the form of agreement is 
a matter for them. The Commission's role is facilitative. In carrying out that role 
it should remain neutral about the form of agreement while attempting to protect 
the rights of each party. It is a part of the scheme that employees who so choose 
may be represented in negotiations by their union. Any directions the Commis-
sion makes should protect that right. The Act also provides that an employer may 
seek to make an agreement directly with its employees. In making directions the 
Commission should also protect that right. The power to make directions should 
not be exercised so as to pre-empt the right of either party to seek the type of 
agreement which it prefers.30 
Further, based on the commission’s duty to act according to equity and good 
conscience, it could issue directions “which preserve the rights of all parties to 
pursue the type of agreement they prefer” and generally “to ensure a fair process 
is adopted”.31 In the subsequent Tenix Solutions case, involving another stand-off 
concerning the type of agreement and a refusal by the employer to negotiate 
with the union, the union sought a ballot of employees to ascertain their pre-
ferred form of agreement. The ballot was ordered on the basis that fair and 
effective agreement-making is facilitated by both the parties and the commission 
being appraised of the views of the employees concerned; however an interim 
order restraining the company from pursuing AWAs was stayed on appeal as this 
would impair the employer’s own bargaining rights.32 
It seems now that the AIRC may order a party to: provide information, clarify its 
position, conduct a ballot, recognise employee representation by a union or other 
person, and attend negotiation meetings or conciliation conferences chaired by 
the commission. Although the facilitative function is limited and cannot impinge 
on the bargaining rights of parties, its development is significant because other 
statutory avenues (such as claims of duress or coercive industrial action) have 
been ineffective in addressing employer strategies of non-recognition and the 
undermining of collective conditions.33 
30 Community and Public Sector Union v Sensis Pty Ltd (2003) 128 Industrial Reports 92 at 
[25]. 
31 Ibid at [26]-[27]; affirmed in Sensis Pty Ltd v Members of the Full Bench of the Industrial 
Relations Commission [2005] FCAFC 74. 
32 Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Tenix Solutions Pty 
Ltd, PR954451,17/12/04; Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Un-
ion v Tenix Solutions Pty Ltd, PR954698, 24/12/04. 
33 WRA ss. 170WG, 170NC, Burnie Port Corporation Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia 
(2000) 97 Federal Court Reports 186; see Lee M, “Crafting Remedies for Bad Faith Bar-
gaining, Coercion and Duress: ‘Relative Ethical Flexibility’ in the Twenty-first Century” 
(2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law at 46, 48, 52. 
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Agreement-making process 
In keeping with the legislation’s focus on agreement making and validity rather 
than bargaining per se, the bargaining process itself is relatively unregulated by 
formal rules. Those rules which exist are imposed as part of the requirements for 
certification; as a consequence the AIRC has little sway in bargaining which is not 
concluded successfully with a formal agreement. The commission’s involvement 
is likely to be after the event; it has not usually influenced bargaining in ’real 
time.’ 
The certification requirements associated with the agreement-making process 
are concerned with provision of information, the right to representation, and en-
suring real consent by a majority of employees.34 Agreements made between an 
employer and employees directly are subjected to the greatest level of regulation. 
In such cases the employer initiating an agreement must give at least 14 days’ 
notice to the employees affected of the intention to make an agreement. The em-
ployees must be given “ready access” to the proposed agreement and reasonable 
steps taken to have its terms explained to them “in ways which are appropriate 
having regard to their circumstances and needs.”35 The employer must also no-
tify employees of their right to be represented by a union and, if this right is 
taken up, provide the appointed union with “a reasonable opportunity to meet 
and confer about the proposed agreement”; it is a penalty offence to coerce an 
employee not to make such a representation request.36 In numerous recent deci-
sions the commission has strongly emphasised that employers must provide this 
information in a way which does not detract from the employees’ right to repre-
sentation.37 Agreements made between employers and unions require only that 
employees be given access to the agreement and an explanation of its terms; the 
other safeguards are presumably met by the involvement of a union as a party.38 
Bargaining is also regulated in a formal way through invocation of the freedom 
of association provisions. The WRA made it an offence for any person to take or 
threaten any action (including industrial action) with the intent to coerce another 
into making an agreement  although this does not apply to protected action 
within the bargaining period. This anti-coercion rule addresses the issue of real 
consent in bargaining. 39 Like other provisions in the WRA dealing with the proc-
 
34 See Ross I and Trew J, Informed Consent to Agreement Making under the Workplace Re-
lations Act 1996 (Cth), Working Paper 68, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Training, Sydney, June 2001. 
35 WRA ss.170LK, 170LT(7). 
36 WRA ss. 170LT(9); 170NC(3).  
37 Re TTI Stone Pty Ltd Certified Agreement 2001-2004, PR921381, 16/8/02. 
38 WRA ss.170LJ(3), 170LR. 
39 WRA s.170NC; Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, 
Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2001) 109 
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ess of agreement-making, it might be regarded as an instance of indirect or meta- 
regulation. However, as it is enforced not by a mediatory body like the commis-
sion but through a formal adversarial process in the Federal Court (with penal 
and injunctive remedies), it does not provide an effective means for creating or 
restoring a positive bargaining environment. It is more likely to be used to attack 
or forestall the tactics of adversaries: it was one basis of the ‘anti-suit suit’ in-
junction by unions in response to employer tactics to shut down union industrial 
action through common law remedies.40 The anti-coercion provision has most 
often been prosecuted by the Employment Advocate in campaigns against un-
ions; although its successes have been limited, the act of prosecution has itself 
had a regulatory impact. As another prohibition on industrial action the anti-
coercion rule also serves to channel action into the regulatory structure of the 
bargaining period.  
All agreements must be approved by a valid majority of “the persons employed 
at the time whose employment will be subject to the agreement.”41 Although the 
legislation specifically states that the agreement must be genuinely made or ap-
proved by the employees, there are no requirements for the actual approval 
process. The view that genuine approval implies requirements of informed con-
sent and absence of coercion was established under the previous legislation,42 
and this approach has been continued. Commission members generally favour a 
secret ballot, but other methods — including signing a circulated copy, tele-
voting and a show of hands — have been approved provided no coercion is ap-
parent. However if a ballot is used, deficiencies in its conduct or the eligibility to 
vote will mean that the agreement was not genuinely approved by a valid major-
ity.43 
Certification 
The certification hearing is the primary regulatory arena for bargaining. Defi-
ciencies in rule-observance are most likely to come to light in an application 
which is opposed by a union: either a union seeking to block an employer’s 
agreement with its employees, or a union challenging a deal between an em-
ployer and a rival union. Deficiencies occasionally emerge from the evidence 
 
Federal Court Reports 378; National Union of Workers v Qenos (2001) 108 Federal Court 
Reports 90. 
40 de Felice V, “Stopping or Preventing Industrial Action in Australia” (2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review at 336. 
41 WRA ss.170LJ(2), 170LR(1), 170LT(6). 
42 Re Toys'R'Us (Australia) Pty Ltd Enterprise Flexibility Agreement 1994, Print L9066, 
3/2/99; VHA Trading Company v Australian Services Union, Print N9390, 7/3/97. 
43 WRA s.170LT(5), (6); Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Employees Association, Print T2319, 19/10/00 at [14]; Re Endeavour Petroleum Pty Ltd 
Certified Agreement 2004, PR957131, 8/4/05 at [68].  
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produced to support compliance with the statutory requirements, indicating ei-
ther lack of close attention to (understanding of) the procedural rules, or 
attempts to squeeze through employer-initiated arrangements which are essen-
tially inconsistent with the formal legal institution of consensual enterprise 
agreements. For example, in one recent case the employer argued that only em-
ployees who were made an offer to work under a certified agreement were 
covered by the agreement and therefore eligible to vote; the argument was re-
jected (on appeal) as fundamentally confusing the statutory agreement 
institution and its process with that for individual contracts.44 This was at least 
an upfront ‘creative’ attempt to mould the bargaining institution; other cases 
have more closely resembled fraud. Before his retirement, one of the most ex-
perienced commission members, Munro J, warned on the basis of direct 
experience that “it is not rare to find proposed agreements that approximate to 
shams,” and to confirm the need to scrutinise applications closely.45 
Tribunal jurisprudence has established that the commission approaches its scru-
tiny in applications for certification in two stages. The first stage is concerned 
with validity, determining whether the agreement conforms to the institution of 
the certified agreement established by the Act. The second stage addresses com-
pliance with the statutory requirements for certification: both the substantive 
content of the agreement and the procedural rules for its making which legiti-
mate the bargaining regime. 46 By placing some matters at the higher level of 
validity and therefore ostensibly beyond its discretion, the commission has 
gained some leeway in the certification process. While agreements which do not 
satisfy the certification requirements can be approved subject to undertakings by 
the parties (designed to remedy defects by bringing performance of the agree-
ment into conformity with the statutory tests), this procedure cannot cure an 
agreement which is considered to suffer from statutory invalidity.47 
In a significant step the AIRC has begun to characterise the statute-imposed re-
quirements for certification as providing important rights to parties during the 
bargaining process. The commission has taken a strict approach to the require-
ments for the agreement-making process under 170LK, considering that they are 
necessary to underpin the statutory object of “fair and effective agreement-
 
44 Re Energy Developments Limited and Employees Of The Company Certified Agreement 
2002 (2003) 121 Industrial Reports 274. 
45 Re Moncreiff Fabrications Labour Services Pty Ltd Certified Agreement (2002) 124 Indus-
trial Reports 47 at [11]. 
46 Re Grocon Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement (Victoria), Print PR927672, 12/2/03; Re Energy 
Developments Limited and Employees of the Company Certified Agreement 2002,
PR928057, 21/2/03 at [30]-[31]. 
47 WRA s. 170LV; Re SJ Weir Pty Ltd, PR 947609, 7/6/04 ; Re KL Ballantyne & National Un-
ion of Workers (Laverton Site) Agreement 2004, PR952656, 22/10/04 at [250]-[255]. 
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making.”48 Even an apparently purely technical provision, such as the one re-
quiring employers to give 14 days’ notice to employees before the making of the 
agreement, is considered a bargaining right because it allows employees to in-
voke their union’s involvement in negotiations.49 If employees are given less 
than the statutory period to examine the agreement, the commission has 
(mostly) taken the view that the deficiency is irremediable, even if the shortfall is 
only one day and is the result of miscalculation.50 
This procedural rights approach is clearest in relation to the requirement that 
the employee be informed of their ability to be represented by a union in nego-
tiations. Initially this was considered in several decisions as simply involving the 
provision of information, and therefore requiring only substantial compliance. In 
most of the recent decisions the representation notice has been regarded as an 
important bargaining safeguard, with its terms needing to be strictly performed. 
However there are significant differences of approach between commission 
members on the degree of exactness required (particularly for the wording of the 
representation notice) and the amount of discretion available in determining 
whether to certify an agreement. In an attempt to relax the strict compliance ap-
proach while retaining a rights perspective, a full bench led by the president of 
the commission has said that the wording of the legislation does not have to be 
reproduced exactly, while confirming the need for close correspondence to the 
statutory requirement.51 The differences in approach among commission mem-
bers are founded on whether the statutory requirements embody bargaining 
rights which must be strenuously upheld. Ultimately such differences come 
down to the role of the commission as a regulator: whether the commission 
should be more concerned with facilitating autonomy or fairness in agreement-
making. 
The main focus in AIRC certification proceedings is a substantive one: whether 
the agreement satisfies the no disadvantage test. This involves an essentially 
subjective assessment whether the terms of the agreement as a whole are less 
favourable to the employee than those of a relevant award, based on documents 
prepared by the applicant. There is no established procedure by which the com-
parison is made, and the forensic thoroughness of the investigation have varied 
markedly. Despite the workload involved, the commission has maintained inde-
 
48 WRA s. 3(e); Re Mobile Food Vans Enterprise Agreement 1998, Print R4468, 6/5/99; Aus-
tralian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union v Mirvac Hotels Pty Ltd t/as 
Sebel of Sydney, Print R6247, 24/6/99. 
49 Re Egan Bros Plumbing & Building Services Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement (2000) 101 In-
dustrial Reports 429 at 433; contra Re Blockbuster Manning & Leeming Certified 
Agreement 2003, PR940464, 13/11/03. 
50 Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association v White's Discounts Pty Ltd (2003) 
128 Industrial Reports 68. 
51 Re Austral Construction Pty Ltd, PR943994, 24/2/04. 
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pendent scrutiny of each agreement (while moving towards a less formal ap-
proach based on documents rather than oral hearings). This is quite unlike the 
process used for AWAs by the Office of Employment Advocate, which has em-
braced licensed self-regulation, compliance mechanisms and targeted inspection: 
meaning that a substantial proportion of agreements are not examined individu-
ally.52 
Private Arbitration of  Agreements 
The shrinking of the commission’s direct regulatory function has to some extent 
been offset by the development of its ‘private arbitration’ jurisdiction. A signifi-
cant feature of bargaining under the WRA has been the willingness of parties to 
give the commission responsibility for settling disputes arising under the agree-
ment. Referrals to the AIRC in accordance with dispute settlement provisions in 
agreements increased at a steady rate since the 1996 Act was introduced, more 
than doubling in the last five years.  
In the large majority of cases, the donation has been in broad and unspecific 
terms, leaving it to the commission itself to determine its powers and proce-
dures. Commission members have taken the view that a general donative clause 
allows the commission to exercise all of its statutory arbitration powers during 
private arbitrations.53 Furthermore, AIRC members have generally taken a liberal 
approach in determining whether a dispute is “over the application of the 
agreement” and thus capable of being settled by the commission.54 The differ-
ence in status does, however, provide significant restrictions: when acting as 
private arbitrators, commission members are constrained by the terms of the 
agreement made by the parties and cannot create completely new obligations. 
Decisions also show that commission members are mindful of their role as facili-
tators of the parties’ intentions rather than as autonomous regulators.  
 
52 Mitchell R et al, Protecting the Worker’s Interest in Enterprise Bargaining: The ‘No Disad-
vantate Test’ in the Australian Federal Industrial Jurisdiction – Final Report (Workplace 
Innovation Unit, Industrial Relations Victoria, Melbourne, 2004) pp 24, 28. 
53 Decisions made after the High Court’s Private Arbitration Case displace the earlier view 
that a positive donation of statutory powers was required in the agreement: eg Qantas 
Flight Catering Ltd v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union 
NSW and ACT (Services) Branch (2003) 128 Industrial Reports 72. 
54 WRA s. 170LW; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing And Kindred Industries 
Union v Holden Ltd (2003) 128 Industrial Reports 101 at [46]; Shop, Distributive and Al-
lied Employees Association v Big W Discount Department Stores, PR924554, 12/11/02 at 
[23]. 
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Conclusion: The Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
as a Meta-Regulator 
As a tribunal, the AIRC is a distinctive type of organisation. It is large, complex, 
bureaucratic, legalistic and diffusely-structured. Its 46 full-time members act 
with a high degree of autonomy, and there is limited co-ordination of policy. 
Even the mechanism of appeals to a full bench does not provide uniformity in 
approach, and there have been significant disagreements of principle within the 
commission concerning its functions and powers in relation to bargaining. The 
AIRC is constrained not only by its organisational nature, but by numerous com-
plex legal norms: principally the Act itself, but also the decisions of courts. As it 
operates within a contested political space, it is regularly subjected to political 
pressures. It is constrained in a general way by the expectations and strategic ac-
tions of parties; and the need to maintain relevance and legitimacy (a battle 
which it now seems to have lost). 
While traditionally the AIRC has acted as a direct regulator in setting minimum 
conditions through awards, in the arena of bargaining the commission functions 
as a meta-regulator, influencing the conduct of interactions between bargaining 
parties. A meta-regulator is concerned less with the detailed management of out-
comes and more with overseeing the general terms by which parties will regulate 
their conduct. The regulation involved is procedural, setting the terms on which 
the objectives of regulation may be met by the parties own strategies. Optimally, 
this should involve not only shaping the institutional pathways for regulatory 
compliance by parties (facilitation), but also promoting the will and culture for 
compliance within and between organisations (motivation), and providing the 
means for scrutiny and improvement (accountability). All are necessary for effec-
tive self- or co-regulation.55 In the context of labour regulation, procedural 
standards do not directly establish the conditions and conduct of working rela-
tionships, but provide a supporting framework for the negotiation of such 
relationships.56 
However the AIRC is a weak meta-regulator within the regulatory arena of labour 
market bargaining. It has not determined the bargaining environment, or even 
supervised conduct in any close or active way. Rather the total pattern of its in-
teractions (past decisions, attitudes of commission members, and expectations of 
them held by other actors) together with the structure of formal legal rules pro-
vided by the Act, influences the bargaining parties in relation to a number of 
 
55 Parker C, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge 
UP, Cambridge, 2002) pp 245-7. 
56 Deakin S and Wilkinson F, “Labour Law and Economic Theory: A Reappraisal” in Collins 
H, Davies P and Rideout R (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (Kluwer 
Law International, London, 2000) p 32. 
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strategic choices, such as whether to bargain, when, with whom, and how. These 
decisions are affected by the history of Commission interventions: what is doing 
as well as what it is not doing but leaving to others, whether because it is consid-
ered to beyond the commission’s powers or legitimate area of operation. Even in 
a formal sense the AIRC's meta-regulatory functions vary: in terms of their self-
acting effect they may be strong (orders granting or withdrawing rights, eg order 
to confer or hold ballot, termination of bargaining period), or may be weak (rec-
ommendations, conciliation, facilitation). Its primary functions are the approval 
of standards made by the parties, and attempting to assist in resolution of block-
ages in the bargaining process through facilitation of agreement-making, 
together with limited monitoring through the certification of agreements. Its 
ability to monitor and regulate the bargaining process is limited by formal norms 
(the limits recognised in Sensis) and the commission has no enforcement powers. 
By contrast, other social actors may act through informal institutions or even 
outside them. 
Despite its weak and limited powers in the bargaining and certification proc-
esses, the AIRC has extended its functions by formulating its role in terms of 
protecting the statute-derived bargaining rights of parties. There is some conti-
nuity here with the commission’s traditional values based on fairness and 
industrial justice. Recently, it has also maintained relevance by developing its fa-
cilitative and private arbitration functions, It has been able to do this because of 
the trust which has continued to be held in it by many of the bargaining ac-
tors.57 
The use of certification as a regulatory tool was the result of a hybrid system of 
awards and agreements. The purpose of the certification regime for agreements 
was to ensure that there was no derogation from the public award standard 
without prior scrutiny by an independent responsible body. In order to limit the 
degree of intervention, successive amendments shifted the standard from a 
“public interest” test to the “no disadvantage” based on the calculus of private 
interests. Some regulatory space was still to be found in the procedural require-
ments for certification – particularly regarding the provision of information to 
employees, because it was here that any idea of free and informed consent was 
founded. Regulation by the AIRC on this basis has appeared to critics to be pe-
dantic intermeddling, but contained some important safeguards. 
The federal government’s ‘WorkChoices’ reforms will remove virtually all of 
these regulatory waypoints, from the AIRC’s scrutiny of agreements in the certi-
fication process, to the application of the no-disadvantage standard. The 
changes, described as making the agreement-making process more ‘streamlined’, 
will result in a shrinking of public regulatory space. Approval of collective 
 
57 Forbes-Mewett H, Griffin G and McKenzie D, “The Australian Industrial Relations Comis-
sion: Adapting or Dying?” (2003) 11 International Journal of Employment Studies 1. 
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agreements will in future be handled by the Office of the Employment Advocate, 
using an administrative lodgment process similar to the processing of AWAs. 
Agreements will come into effect on lodgment, and approval will be based on 
statutory declarations provided by the employer. If the Employment Advocate’s 
current procedures are any guide, monitoring of compliance will become routi-
nised and independent scrutiny is likely to be exceptional. Some of the 
procedural requirements will remain, such as valid majority approval for collec-
tive agreements, and the duty to provide information to employees about their 
rights in the process (now to be satisfied by a standard statement authored by 
the Employment Advocate). However there will be no effective means of en-
forcement. Private arbitration by the AIRC will be allowed, but parties will have 
to list precisely the powers which they wish to confer, which will limit the effec-
tiveness of the commission’s involvement. 
Instead of meta-regulation by scrutiny of procedural norms, the reforms propose 
a shift to direct regulation using the traditional policing method of complaint-
based prosecution, with the prospect of court-imposed financial penalties for vio-
lation of the procedural requirements or for bargaining conduct subsequently 
found to have been coercive or misleading. Enforcement will become part of a 
compliance regime operated by the Office of Workplace Services (the successor 
to the former arbitration inspectorate), which will use education and assistance 
to promote observance of the Act, along with inspections and prosecutions in re-
sponse to individual complaints.58 While this appears to be embracing ‘new 
regulation’ techniques, the concentration of compliance in a government agency 
with no sanctions other than prosecution, and the removal of procedural mecha-
nisms such as certification (which uses consequences-based enforcement by 
denial of legal validity), are a return to traditional methods of direct regulation.  
The regulatory spectrum is not limited to a choice between a weak meta-
regulator with limited powers, and command-based enforcement which is likely 
to be illusory. We might contrast these alternatives with other models of far 
more successful regulatory agencies, such as the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, which are able to work in a proactive and effective man-
ner through a variety of formal and informal regulatory techniques. In the field 
of labour relations, a model of a kind is provided by New Zealand under the Em-
ployment Relations Act 2000, where judicially-based institutions have been made 
a secondary resort. Instead, the overwhelming source of institutional regulation 
is through a code of bargaining practice and the Employment Relations Author-
ity, a body which is investigative rather than judicial in nature. It is much more 
 
58 Australian Government, WorkChoices: A New Workplace Relations System, (released 6 
October 2005). pp 19-21, 43. On recent restructuring and reduction in support for OWS, 
see the paper by Margaret Lee in this volume. Unions will retain the power to prosecute 
breaches of agreements, but in most cases only on behalf of individual members, as 
they will no longer be able to become parties to collective agreements negotiated di-
rectly with employees. 
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akin to the model of independent public agency which is now common in many 
regulatory arenas: an active, flexible and responsive meta-regulator, geared to-
wards mediation but possessing a substantial array of escalating powers in 
reserve. 
 
